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CIVIL RIGHTS: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
INTRODUCTION
Every year the courts are burdened with a vast number of civil rights
claims against government officials. This saddles the judicial system
with the complex task of balancing the public policy interests of the state
against the interest in safeguarding an individual's rights.' Most of the
recent controversy regarding immunity for officials and municipalities
revolves around ambiguous legislative intent and recent judicial expan-
sion of the law surrounding civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.2 During the present survey period,3 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was placed in the difficult position of weighing the need to
compensate individuals for the constitutional harms they suffer against
the need to provide public officials and municipalities with room for
discretion.
This survey examines the Tenth Circuit's approach to qualified im-
munity and municipal liability actions arising under section 1983.' Part I
discusses the procedural and substantive process of appeal from sum-
mary judgment based upon qualified immunity, particularly those judi-
cial tests developed for assessing alleged violations of an individual's
First Amendment right to free speech. Part II focuses on recent proce-
dural changes developed for reviewing the denial of qualified immunity
to city officials. Finally, Part III evaluates how the court determines mu-
nicipal liability and in what context a municipality will be held liable for
its policies or customs.
1. See Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitu-
tional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 262 (1995) (discussing the dilemma facing federal
courts using judicial standards to balance the need to insulate public officials from needless litigation
against the need to compensate individuals whose rights have been violated).
2. See David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the
Search for the Legislative Will, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 497, 499 (1992) (indicating that the immunity
doctrine is unstable due to inconsistencies in the Court's interpretive function).
3. The survey period addresses cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit from September 1, 1997 through August 31, 1998.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides individuals with a cause of action, stating in relevant
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ... except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.
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I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 1983
A. Background
The Supreme Court has struggled with the doctrine of qualified im-
munity over the past four decades Although not specifically mentioned
in section 1983, the Supreme Court has incorporated this doctrine into
interpretations of the statute.6 Qualified immunity provides state and lo-
cal officials with an affirmative defense that shields them from ciVil li-
ability while performing discretionary functions.' The doctrine is prm-
ised on the perceived societal need to allow officials leeway in their dis-
cretionary roles and to protect those who could not have anticipated that
their conduct was unconstitutional! By applying qualified immunity to
section 1983 jurisprudence, the Court recognized the importance of pro-
tecting officials from over-deterrence, undue interference with official
duties, and potentially disabling threats of liability.9
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald,"6 which
affords state and local officials increased protection upon the assertion of
the immunity defense." Harlow sets forth a broad set of general guidelines
that require lower courts to analyze immunity claims on a case-by-case
basis.'2 These guidelines require weighing the fundamental concerns of
both an individual's need for relief against the need to limit a public offi-
cial's liability. As with all balancing tests, there is wide room for judicial
discretion." Following the guidelines set out in Harlow, the Tenth Circuit
developed a framework for analyzing qualified immunity cases.
The Tenth Circuit's standard of review for examining qualified im-
munity issues consists of a three-part test (hereinafter the "Immunity
Test"). If the plaintiff fails to satisfy any part of this test, a court will
grant qualified immunity to the defendant." The first part of the analysis
requires that the pleadings set forth all of the factual allegations neces-
sary to sustain a finding that the defendant violated a constitutionally or
5. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (holding that no civil liability attaches
to officials for actions constituting legitimate legislative activity).
6. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339 (1986).
7. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
8. Cf. Chen, supra note 1, at 273.
9. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
10. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
11. See id. Following its decision in Harlow, the Court established stricter guidelines to pro-
tect officials from liability. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (adopting a "reasonable
official" standard of review for allegedly unconstitutional official action).
12. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (discussing the public policy concerns involved in denying or
granting qualified immunity); cf Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 (applying an "objective reasonable" stan-
dard to determine whether qualified immunity should be granted); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
528 (1985) (characterizing defendant's claim of immunity as one raising a question of law properly
addressed in the appellate court).
13. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806-07.
14. See Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir. 1995).
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statutorily protected right." Second, the plaintiff must show that the right
violated was clearly established prior to the conduct in question."' Fi-
nally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable official would
have known that her conduct violate4 this clearly established right."
The Immunity Test applies in all instances where qualified immu-
nity is asserted as a defense to section 1983 claims. The Supreme Court,
however, has expanded certain types of claims, particularly those arising
under the First Amendment. In these cases, the third prong of the Immu-
nity Test requires proof of an improper motive in order for a plaintiff's
action to survive a motion for summary judgment based upon qualified
immunity."
Section 1983 claims requiring proof of improper motive are subjected
to a heightened pleading standard. Examples of such claims include those
alleging retaliation for the exercise of free speech in violation of the First
Amendment,"' race and gender discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause,2 and violations of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.2' The rationale behind subjecting
these claims to a heightened pleading standard is that while improper mo-
tive is easy to allege, it is difficult for officials to disprove.' Since motive
is a pure issue of fact, normally left for the trier of fact, the court must de-
termine whether the defendant possessed the requisite state of mind for a
plaintiff's claim to survive a motion to dismiss.'
Over the last few years, appellate courts have imposed the height-
ened burden of proof whenever improper motive is a required element of
the claim.' The purpose for adopting this heightened burden of proof is
15. See Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (10th Cir.
1988).
16. See Davis v. Sherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984) (stating that a defendant asserting qualified
immunity prevails if, at the time of the conduct in question, there was no clearly established law to
put her on notice that the conduct was unconstitutional); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530-34 (indicating
that defendant is entitled to qualified ithmunity, even though his actions were unconstitutional, if at
the time of the conduct it was not clearly established that the behavior was unconstitutional). This
requirement serves to ensure that the defendant was on notice that the right existed. See Garramone
v. Romo, 94 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-.
41 (1987); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530; Davis, 468 U.S. at 191 (1984).
17. See Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir. 1997).
18. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1590(1998).
19. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
20. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
21. See, e.g., Farmerv. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
22. See Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1590.
23. See id.
24. See Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role
of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 82 (1997). Courts adopting this approach
typically require the plaintiff to produce "specific, non-conclusory factual allegations" to establish
the official's state of mind before discovery takes place on a motion for summary judgment. See
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to protect public officials from the costs associated with defending
against civil actions.' 'These social costs include the expense of litiga-
tion, diversion of official energy from pressing public issues and the de-
terrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office."'
During the present survey period, however, the Supreme Court de-
cided Crawford-El v. Britton," which addressed the propriety of a
heightened pleading standard above and beyond that already required for
qualified immunity. In Crawford-El, the D.C. Circuit created a height-
ened evidentiary standard requiring a plaintiff, prior to any discovery,, to
produce clear and convincing evidence of improper motive in order to
defeat an official's assertion of qualified immunity. 8 This pleadifig re-
quirement raised the original standard, which required only the pro4c-
tion of specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact.
In beginning its analysis, the Supreme Court cited its holding in
Harlow,2' in which it determined that a "bare allegation of malice should
not suffice to subject government officials either to the cost of trial or to
the burdens of broad-reaching discovery."" The Court continued, holding
that when reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court
should focus only on the legal question of whether the official's conduct
violated a clearly established law." The Court indicated, however, that in
situations where a plaintiff asserts a claim requiring proof of wrongful
motive, the appellate court may require the plaintiff to put forward "spe-
cific, non-conclusory factual allegations that establish improper mo-
tive.., in order [for the claim] to survive [a] defendant's pre-discovery
motion for dismissal or summary judgment."" In doing so, the Court
reasoned that this requirement does not rise to the level of a new height-
ened pleading standard, but relies on existing procedures that are avail-
able to federal judges handling claims that involve the examination of an
official's state of mind.3
In reviewing a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss in a First
Amendment case, the court must apply a modified version of the Immu-
nity Test. As previously noted, the first part of the test addresses whether
Sheppard v. Beerman, 94 F.3d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1996); Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1535
(10th Cir. 1995); Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991).
25. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
26. Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1593 n.12.
27. 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998).
28. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).
29. Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1591-92.
30. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.
31. See Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1592.
32. Id. at 1596-97.
33. See id. at 1596. The Court discussed two primary options open to a trial court prior to
permitting any discovery at all. See id. The first entails ordering a reply to the defendant's answer.
See id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a)). The second involves granting the defendant's motion for a niore
definite statement. See id. (citing FED. R. Crv. P. 12(e)).
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the plaintiffs pleadings allege sufficient facts to support a finding that
the defendant violated a constitutionally or statutorily protected right. In
the First Amendment free speech context, a plaintiff will only prevail on
this aspect of the qualified immunity analysis if it can be shown that the
speech in question is protected. This analysis requires the balancing of
four factors set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Pickering v.
Board of Education." The plaintiff's speech must involve a matter of
public concern; the violation must outweigh the employer's interest in
maintaining an efficient workplace; the speech must have been a sub-
stantial factor in the detrimental employment action; and it must be dem-
.onstrated that the defendant, in the absence of the protected speech,
would have taken the same action against the plaintiff.' The plaintiff will
prevail on the first prong of the Immunity Test only with the satisfaction
of each element of this four-part test (Pickering balancing test).
After the plaintiff successfully demonstrates that the governmental
action was taken in disregard of a protected speech activity, the second
prong of the Immunity Test requires the court to examine whether the
First Amendment right was clearly established prior to the conduct in
question." Third, the court must analyze whether the defendant knew or
should have known that her conduct violated the clearly established
right." Satisfaction of these three prongs allows a plaintiff to survive a
motion to dismiss founded upon qualified immunity. The following case
is illustrative of the judicial struggle to compensate victims for violations
of their rights while continuing to defer to an official's discretion in car-
rying out her duties.
34. See, e.g., Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (10th Cir.
1988).
35. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
36. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Matters of public concern are those of interest to the
community, such as social or political concerns. See Lytle v. City of Haysville, 138 F.3d 857, 863
(10th Cir. 1998).
37. See Davis v. Sherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984) (stating that a defendant asserting qualified
immunity prevails if, at the time of the conduct in question, there was no clearly established law to
put her on notice that the conduct was unconstitutional); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
530-34 (1984) (indicating that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, even though his actions
were unconstitutional, if at the time of the conduct it was not clearly established that the behavior
was unconstitutional).
38. See Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit has
noted the difficulty in holding public officials accountable for violating First Amendment rights
determined through the use of a Pickering balancing test. See Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879
F.2d 706, 728-29 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that while public officials lose immunity in the face of
clearly established law, "because a rule of law determined by a balancing of interests is inevitably
difficult to anticipate, it follows that where Pickering balancing is required, the law is less likely to
be well established than in other cases"), reh'g granted on other grounds, 888 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.
1989).
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
B. Dill v. City of Edmond39
1. Facts
In July 1991, Detective Dennis Dill raised concerns regarding the
culpability of a suspect subsequently convicted of committing a double
homicide.' Dill brought his concerns to his supervisor, but was told not
to pursue the matter any further as it might cause problems with the
case.4' After Dill made additional attempts to provide facts that could
exculpate the suspect, Dill's supervisor demoted him from detective to
patrol officer. '2 Dill filed suit against the City of Edmond, the Chief of
Police, and his immediate supervisor under section 1983, alleging viola-
tion of his First Amendment right to free speech. 3 The district court..dis-
missed the claim, holding that Dill's speech was not constitutionally
protected and that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity."
On appeal, Dill asserted that the district court erred in dismissing his
claim on the basis of qualified immunity. '
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis under the first prong of the
Immunity Test by examining whether Dill's claim properly asserted a
First Amendment free speech violation as informed by the four-factor
Pickering balancing approach. Addressing the first two factors, the Tenth
Circuit analyzed whether the speech involved matters of a public concern
that outweighed the interest of the employer in promoting the efficiency
of the public services. ' The court observed that the district court improp-
erly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, even though it was un-
clear whether Dill's speech was disruptive to the operation of the
Edmond Police Department. ' In addressing this issue, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the defendants' interests in maintaining efficiency did
not outweigh Dill's interest in "discussing possible police misconduct
39. 155 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1998).
40. Dill, 155 F.3d at 1200.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1200-01.
43. See id. at 1201.
44. See id.
45. See id
46. See id. (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). In Pickering, the
Supreme Court held that, in order to determine whether an employee's speech is constitutionally
protected, a court must evaluate whether (1) the speech involves a matter of public concern, (2) the
violation outweighs the employer's interests of public service efficiency, (3) the speech was a "sub-
stantial factor or motivating factor" in the detrimental action of the employer, and (4) in the absence
of the protected speech, the same action would have been taken against the employee. See Pickering,
391 U.S. at 568; see also Lytle v. City of Haysville, 138 F.3d 857, 863 (10th Cir. 1998); Gardetto v.
Mason 100 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing the four-step test for reviewing a retaliation
claim).
47. See Dill, 155 F.3d at 1203.
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during a homicide investigation.'"5 Next, with respect to the third factor
of Pickering, the court held that Dill's statements concerning the exis-
tence of exculpatory evidence was a direct cause of his demotion from
detective to patrol officer.' Finally, under the fourth factor, the court
concluded that the defendants' actions were retaliatory and that they pro-
vided no evidence that the same action would have been taken had his
speech not been protected.' Balancing these factors, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that Dill successfully met the Pickering test and, therefore,
Dill established the existence of a First Amendment right satisfying the
first prong of the Immunity Test.
Having decided that Dill's pleadings asserted a First Amendment
free speech claim, the Tenth Circuit evaluated the remaining two prongs
of the Immunity Test-whether the right was clearly established prior to
the governmental activity in question and whether a reasonable official
would have known the conduct violated that right!' The court found that
the "protected status of [Dill's] speech was sufficiently clear that the
defendants reasonably should have been on notice that their actions
would violate [his] First Amendment rights." 2 Relying on both its own
precedent and relevant cases from other circuits, the court concluded that
Dill's demotion from detective to patrol officer was unreasonable and
violative of the First Amendment. 3
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit began by examining the nature and scope of the
First Amendment right to free speech. The court was careful to keep in
mind the importance of balancing the need to protect individual liberties
against governmental and social welfare concerns. The question of the
48. Id. (citing Ramirez v. Oklahoma Dep't of Mental Health, 41 F.3d 584, 595 (10th Cir.
1994)).
49. See id. at 1205.
50. See id. at 1204.
51. See id. (citing Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1293 (10th Cir. 1997) (determining
that the heightened pleading standard required the complaint to contain "specific non-conclusory
allegations of fact sufficient to allow the district court to determine that those facts, if proved [and
construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff], demonstrate that the actions taken were not
objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law")).
52. Id. The Tenth Circuit relied on Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), which held
that the unlawfulness of the conduct in question only has to be evident in light of pre-existing law,
rather than declaring the specific right unlawful in previous precedent. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at
640. A clearly established right is apparent when there is a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision
on point, or when "the clear weight of authority from other courts ... 'found the law to be as the
plaintiff maintains."' Id. at 1205 (quoting Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493,
1498 (10th Cir. 1992)).
53. See Dill, 155 F.3d at 1204 (citing Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 72, 74 (1990)
(holding that the denial of transfers or promotions because of employee's political affiliation can be
a basis for a First Amendment violation) and Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 (10th Cir.
1986) (holding that a First Amendment violation occurred when a public school teacher was har-
assed, reprimanded, and suspended because of her complaints about school conditions)).
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extent to which the court may deny an individual a remedy for depriva-
tion of a constitutional right to further the public policy goal of protect-
ing officials from needless litigation underlies any determination of im-
munity. In this last year, the Tenth Circuit grappled with immunity issues
and utilized the Supreme Court's view of sound public policy, adhering
to the approaches set forth in Harlow and Crawford-El.'
In Dill, the Tenth Circuit tipped the scales toward the need to com-
pensate individuals for their injuries over the desire to protect public
officials. Applying the Pickering balancing test, the Dill court held that a
person's interest in having their right to speak freely protected out-
weighed the public policy interest in shielding officials from excessive
litigation.5 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit focused more on the possible
retaliatory behavior of public officials than on the employee's disruptive
speech.'
D. Other Circuits
Other circuits have addressed similar First Amendment issues in a
manner consistent with that of the Tenth Circuit. For example, the Sec-
ond Circuit, in Gubitosi v. Kapica,7 applied the analysis set forth in
Crawford-El to determine whether the plaintiff was fired from her job in
retaliation for the exercise of her right to free speech.' Before the court
could determine that the plaintiffs right was clearly established and that
the defendant violated that right, the plaintiff had to provide evidence
from which a jury could conclude that the official engaged in retaliation
against her." In doing so, the Second Circuit noted that once the official
has made a properly supported motion for summary judgment based
upon qualified immunity, the plaintiff "may not respond [in her plead-
ings] simply with general attacks upon the defendant's credibility.
' '
The Second Circuit recognized that the pleadings evidenced a "total
absence of evidence of retaliation," and noted that there were other sig-
nificant reasons that could have resulted in termination of her employ-
ment." The Second Circuit also concluded that the plaintiff failed to es-
tablish that the defendant violated a clearly established law prohibiting
54. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (lessening the standard used in deter-
mining if an official is protected under qualified immunity from a requirement to act both subjec-
tively and objectively in good faith to merely whether a reasonable official would have been aware
that he committed a constitutional violation); see Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1587
(1998) (sustaining the original pleading standard that requires a plaintiff to allege specific non-
conclusory facts in determining whether a First Amendment right to free speech was established).
55. See Dill, 155 F.3d at 1203.
56. Cf. id.
57. 154 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1998).
58. See Gubitosi, 154 F.3d at 33 (quoting Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1598).
59. See id.




such retaliation.' Thus, the plaintiff failed to show the defendant was
objectively unreasonable in assuming that he did not violate the plain-
tiff's First Amendment right to free speech.'
The Eleventh Circuit, in Martin v. Baugh,' reversed the district
court's denial of qualified immunity based upon the plaintiff's failure to
allege facts sufficient to establish a violation of his right to free speech.'
The plaintiff, a radio technician, claimed that his supervisor retaliated
against him for criticizing the way in which the city awarded a contract."
The plaintiff argued that his statements constituted speech protected by
the First Amendment and that his supervisor's disciplinary actions
against him violated clearly established law.' The Eleventh Circuit, not-
ing the inherent difficulty in establishing whether certain speech should
be protected," applied the Pickering balancing test to determine whether
"(1) the speech at issue involve[d] a matter of public concern, and (2) the
value of the speech outweigh[ed] its potential for disruption of govern-
ment workplace efficiency." Noting that the Pickering test requires le-
gal determinations that are greatly fact-specific and does not provide a
"clear, bright-line rule[],"'' the court found that a reasonable person could
not have known that the conduct at issue would give rise to a First
Amendment violation." The plaintiff failed to provide any case law that
could have put the defendant on notice that his disciplinary actions were
in violation of a First Amendment right.' Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that "qualified immunity is a doctrine that focuses on the actual, on
the specific, on the details of concrete cases."73 Therefore, the court held
that the law was not clearly established at the time of the defendant's
conduct and reversed the decision of the lower court.'
The Eighth Circuit, in Porter v. Dawson Education Services Coop-
erative,' dealt with a case in which a public employee brought a section
1983 action against board members for her discharge based upon an al-
leged violation of her right to free speech. The district court set aside the
jury verdict and entered judgment in favor of the board members. 6 The
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. 141 F.3d 1417 (llthCir. 1998).
65. See Martin, 141 F.3dat 1418.
66. See id
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1420.




73. Ud. at 1420-21 (quoting Lassite
Cir. 1994)).
74. See id.
75. 150 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 1998).
76. See Porter, 150 F.3d at 891-92.
of Educ,, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
r v. Alabama A&M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (11th
1999]
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Eighth Circuit determined that "when [the Pickering balancing test] is at
issue, the asserted First Amendment right can rarely be considered
'clearly established' for purposes of the Harlow qualified immunity
standard."' The Eighth Circuit, conducting the Pickering balancing test,
held that "the government's interest as an employer in the effective
functioning of the workplace outweighed appellant's interest in speaking
on the issue of the confidentiality of student identification information."'
Notwithstanding its holding in Porter, however, the Eighth Circuit
found that the plaintiff in Campbell v. Arkansas Department of Correc-
tion' met the requirements of the Pickering balancing test.'m Once again,
the plaintiff brought a section 1983 claim for violation of his free speech
rights. The plaintiff, a prison warden, spoke out about unsatisfactory
conditions at the prison.' In applying the Pickering balancing test, the
court focused on the first factor, seeking to determine whether protecting
the plaintiff's speech was considered a matter of, public concern. 2 The
court held that the plaintiff had a "right to bring [the complained of]
problems to light both within the department and in a manner that at-
tracted media attention""' and recognized that prior case law clearly es-
tablished protection of this type of speech. ' Moreover, the court con-
cluded that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity be-
cause a reasonable person would have known that retaliating against the
plaintiff for speaking out on issues of public concern violates the plain-
tiff's First Amendment rights. 5
II. REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DENIALS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
A. Background
Over the last several years, the Supreme Court has taken traditional
rules of procedure and broadly expanded them at the appellate level.' For
instance, it held that pretrial orders denying qualified' immunity are im-
77. Id. at 892 (discussing the application of the Pickering balancing test for determining
whether an employer's termination of a public employee violated the First Amendment).
78. Id. at 895. In doing so, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district court, which
likewise found that the Pickering balancing test favored the public employer. See id. at 892.
79. 155 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 1998).
80. See Campbell, 155 F.3d at 950.
81. See id. at 960.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See id. (citing Powell v. Basham, 921 F.2d 165, 167 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that a "deputy
sheriff s comments to superiors about concerns that touched on department operations and efficiency
involved matters of public concern")).
85. See id.
86. See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305-07 (1996) (stating that appeals from
summary judgment orders denying qualified immunity are not always precluded when material facts




mediately appealable."7 This allows an appellate court to grant defendants
qualified immunity based solely on the pleadings, without discovery or a
trial." As a result, an adverse decision at the appellate level can legally
deprive victims of constitutional harms of their day in court. The Court,
in Behrens v. Pelletier,"' also expanded the appellate review process to
allow for multiple appeals of the denial of qualified immunity.
When reviewing district court orders denying qualified immunity,
the federal circuits adhere to the standards set forth in Behrens" and its
predecessor, Johnson v. Jones.9" Using these standards, the Tenth Circuit
held that "orders denying qualified immunity before trial are immedi-
ately appealable to the extent they resolve abstract issues of law."' As
justification for its holding, the court observed that orders denying quali-
fied immunity are "collateral"-meaning that they are not the main is-
sues in the case." Accordingly, such orders are immediately appealable."
In order for a denial of qualified immunity to be appropriate, the
district court must determine that there is no abstract question of law at
issue." If the reason for appeal is to assert error in the district court's
denial of qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established
at the time of the alleged violation, then immediate appeal is appropri-
ate.' An order denying qualified immunity is not appealable if the trial
court merely determined that the facts asserted by the plaintiff are suffi-
ciently supported by evidence in the record for the claim to survive
summary judgment.'
87. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,530 (1985) (stating that "a district court's denial of
a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final
decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment").
88. Cf. id.
89. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 308-09 (holding that an appeal from unfavorable qualified im-
munity ruling did not deprive jurisdiction over a second appeal on the same grounds).
90. Seeid. at311-12.
91. 515 U.S. 304, 316 (1995) (finding jurisdiction lacking on the ground that no questions of
law were presented where plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence for a jury to determine that offi-
cials had violated his constitutional rights).
92. Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Behrens, 516 U.S. at 312,
and Johnson, 515 U.S. at 312-14)).
93. Behrens, 516 U.S. at 305 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949)).
94. Prior to Johnson, the Tenth Circuit held that review of denials of qualified immunity was
available regardless of whether the appeal was based upon a question of law or fact. See Austin v.
Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1991) (determining denial of qualified immunity appro-
priate for appellate review where a genuine dispute exists between plaintiffs' and defendants' ac-
counting of relevant facts), overruled by Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
95. See id. at 312-13; see Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528 (indicating that jurisdiction was estab-
lished on appeal because the issue focused on whether the law was clearly established).
96. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524-25.
97. See Foote, 118 F.3d at 1422 (citing Behrens, 516 U.S. at 312 (providing a narrow inter-
pretation of Johnson to allow review of certain orders for summary judgment in cases where the
facts are still in dispute)). For instance, it has been noted that the appellate court, in reviewing this
type of order, will review the disputed facts as well as case law determining whether the law was
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B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Clanton v. Cooper8
a. Facts
Pursuant to a warrant issued by Jody Cooper, an Oklahoma Fire
Marshal Agent, the plaintiff, Carolyn Clanton, was arrested for arson of
her brother's trailer house." The sole basis of the arrest warrant was an
oral statement, which was subsequently proved to be false, made by
Clanton's nephew who later testified that he was coerced by Cooper into
making the statement." Following Clanton's arrest, Cooper asked the
police to hold her, without bail, due to her possible involvement in a
homicide connected with the arson charge."' As a result, the police ar-
rested Clanton and imprisoned her for one to three days (the duration of
imprisonment was in dispute).'" The trial court quashed the warrant for
Clanton's arrest due to a lack of probable cause and the lack of a grand
jury indictment." Clanton then sued Cooper under section 1983 forI dep-
rivation of her liberty on a theory of false arrest and imprisonment."
Specifically, Clanton asserted three violations: (1) knowingly including
false information in the affidavit supporting her arrest warrant, (2)
knowingly providing false information supporting the charges against
her, and (3) coercing her nephew into a false confession." The district
court denied Cooper's motion for summary judgment based upon quali-
fied immunity."° On appeal of the qualified immunity denial, Cooper
argued that "all of his actions were within the scope of his authority,"
and "that he did not violate any 'clearly established' law."'"
clearly established when the defendant's conduct occurred. See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Interlocutory
Appeals from Orders Denying Qualified Immunity: Determining the Proper Scope of Appellate
Jurisdiction, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 21 (1998) (arguing that the appeals courts have misread
the qualified immunity standard articulated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald by granting appellate courts the
power to change procedural rules and expand their jurisdiction). If the law was clearly established
then the review can take place even though disputed issues of material facts exist. See id.; cf
Achtenberg, supra note 2, at 548-49 (asserting that the standard set forth by the Supreme Court
deprives citizens of a trial and overly protects public officials).
98. 129 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 1997).
99. See Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1151.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id at 1151-52.
103. See id. at 1152.
104. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
105. See Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1154.





The Tenth Circuit asserted jurisdiction because the denial of quali-
fied immunity was based upon Cooper's violation of a clearly established
law.'" It first evaluated Clanton's allegation regarding Cooper's state-
ments in the affidavit. The court determined that if Cooper produced
intentionally false information, his conduct would constitute a violation
of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement-a requirement the
court recognized as clearly established law."'
As to the second claim, the Tenth Circuit held that Cooper's request
that the arresting officer detain Clanton due to possible involvement in a
homicide was unconstitutional,"' since the conduct in question violated
Clanton's right to due process of law."' The Tenth Circuit noted that
Clanton failed to cite cases that clearly established the unconstitutionality
of Cooper's conduct."2 Instead of ending its analysis there, however, the
court took it upon itself to determine whether such case law existed. Its
inquiry unearthed Franks v. Delaware,"3 a case labeling as unconstitu-
tional conduct that the court found was substantially similar to that at
issue in the instant matter.' Accordingly, since the law was clearly es-
tablished, the Tenth Circuit held that qualified immunity did not attach to
Cooper."5
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that qualified immunity did not
apply to Cooper with respect to his conduct in eliciting the nephew's
confession."'6 In so holding, the court reviewed its earlier decision in
Griffin v. Strong,"7 which stated, "[t]o be admissible, a confession must
be made freely and voluntarily; it must not be extracted by threats in
violation of due process or obtained by compulsion or inducement of any
sort.""' In the instant case, "Cooper falsely told [Clanton's nephew] that
physical evidence connected him to the crime," and that "he would get a
108. See id. (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995) (stating that the appeals court
has jurisdiction to review "where (1) the defendant [is] a public official asserting a defense of quali-
fied immunity and (2) the issue appealed concern[s] not which facts the parties might be able to
prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts show[] a violation of clearly established law"
(alterations in original))).
109. See id. at 1154 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding "that it
is the deliberate falsity or reckless disregard of the affiant, not of any non-governmental informant
that is unconstitutional"); see also Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that
deliberate falsity or reckless disregard of the affiant is unconstitutional).
110. Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1157.
Ill. Id.at1I56.
112. See id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (holding that the burden
lies with the plaintiff to show that a particular law is so clearly established that a "reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates the law")).
113. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
114. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 154; see also Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1157.
115. See Clanton, 129 F.3dat 1156-57.
116. See id. at 1158.
117. 983 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1993).
118. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1542.
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twenty-five-year sentence if he didn't confess.""" Noting that, in light of
the factual circumstances, the possibility of an involuntary confession
existed, and holding that the law in the area of confessions was clear, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that qualified immunity was inappropriate."O
2. Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co.'
a. Facts
Sylvia Baptiste filed a section 1983 action against Colorado Springs
Police Officers Hernholm and Martin for violation of her Fourth
Amendment rights." Security guards detained Baptiste while shopping at
a J.C. Penney store on suspicion of shoplifting a sterling silver ring."
The security guard's suspicions were aroused while viewing a videotape
depicting Baptiste pulling out a ring she purchased earlier, comparing it
to another which belonged to J.C. Penney, and placing it back in her
bag.' A search of her purse did not produce the ring."
J.C. Penney personnel called Officer Hernholm for assistance. He
viewed the videotape and later requested the service of a female officer,
Officer Martin, to conduct a pat-down search.' " Martin viewed the last
portion of the videotape, conducted the pat down, and found nothing."
The officers then informed Baptiste that she was free to leave."
Following the incident, Baptiste filed a lawsuit alleging that the
officers lacked probable cause to make the arrest and that they violated
her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. In response, the officers moved for summary judgment based
upon qualified immunity-a motion the district court denied." The offi-
cers appealed."'
119. Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1157. The Tenth Circuit applied Griffin to evaluate whether clearly
established law existed before the conduct took place. See id. at 1159 (quoting Griffin, 983 F.2d at
1543 ("Where a promise of leniency has been made in exchange for a statement, an inculpatory
statement would be the product of inducement, and thus not an act of free will.")).
120. See id. Prior to this case, the Tenth Circuit did not specifically address the issue of whether
a reasonable official would have known that using an involuntary confession of a suspect against
another suspect may violate clearly established law. Id.
121. 147 F.3d 1252 (1oth Cir. 1998).




126. See id. at 1255.
127. See id.
128. See id.





The Tenth Circuit found jurisdiction pursuant to its ruling in Clan-
ton.'' At issue on review was the district court's determination that "the
law allegedly violated by the defendant was clearly established at the
time of the challenged actions," and that "under either party's version of
the facts the defendant violated that law.'32
In response to the plaintiffs first claim, the Tenth Circuit cited its
ruling in Anderson v. Creighton3 3 for the proposition that "the contours
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right."'' In reviewing the
defendants' asserted entitlement to qualified immunity, the Tenth Circuit
focused on whether the warrantless arrest violated Baptiste's clearly es-
tablished rights under the Fourth Amendment.3 1 The court evaluated the
warrantless arrest under the probable cause standard" and determined
that, even if the officers mistakenly concluded that probable cause ex-
isted, they were still entitled to qualified immunity so long as they were
reasonable in making that conclusion.3
The officers relied on statements made by the security guards to
assess probable cause.'35 The Tenth Circuit, noting that such an assess-
ment is only necessary absent the officer's personal observations, " con-
cluded that it was unnecessary to rely "solely on a security guard's alle-
gations when the officers [had] before them an exact replication of all the
information on which the guard's allegations [were] based."'" Accord-
ingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the officers were unreasonable in their
finding of probable cause."
In addressing the defendants' second claim, the Tenth Circuit noted
that the law protecting an individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures was clearly established prior to the conduct in
131. See id. at 1255 n.5 (citing Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 1997) (stat-
ing that an order denying a defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immu-
nity is reviewable to the extent that the order resolves abstract issues of law)).
132. Id. (citing Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997)).
133. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
134. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
135. See Baptiste, 147 F.3d at 1256.
136. See id. (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (indicating that the probable cause
standard will determine the propriety of a warrantless arrest)).
137. See id.
138. See id. The officers relied on a Seventh Circuit decision which reasoned that it is sufficient
for an officer to base probable cause on statements made by a witness who seemed to be telling the
truth. See id. (citing Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432,439 (7th Cir. 1986)).
139. See id. at 1257.
140. Id. (citing BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that "a police offi-
cer may not close her or his eyes to facts that would help clarify the circumstances of an arrest")).
141. See id.
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question. 2 In so doing, the court referenced its holding in Lusby v. T.G.
& Y. Stores," in which a guard failing to conduct an independent inves-
tigation as to whether a suspect actually paid for a specific item violated
the constitutional or statutory rights of the plaintiff.'" Noting the similar-
ity of the facts in Lusby to those in the present case and reasoning by
analogy, the Tenth Circuit held that the police officers violated the con-
stitutional rights of Baptiste when they ignored easily accessible evi-
dence."'5 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's de-
nial of qualified immunity.'"
3. Radecki v. Barela"
a. Facts
While attempting to subdue a suspect, Officer Barela asked a by-
stander, Radecki, for assistance; specifically, the officer requested that
Radecki strike the suspect with a flashlight.'" As Radecki approached,
the suspect gained control of Barela's gun and subsequently shot and
killed Radecki.'"
Radecki's survivors brought a section 1983 action against the offi-
cer for violation of Radecki's Fourteenth Amendment right to substan-
tive due process of law.' The claim alleged that the officer, acting in
reckless disregard for public safety, created a dangerous situation that
resulted in Radecki's death. The district court denied Barela's motion
for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.' 2 The Tenth Cir-
cuit reviewed the denial in two separate appeals.'
In his first appeal, Barela asserted that he did not act with "reckless
intent." The Tenth Circuit remanded with an instruction explaining that
"in order for the plaintiff to prevail on a substantive due process claim
142. See id. at 1257-58. The defendants argued that, under existing case law, officers were
permitted to rely on the statements of security guards and that plaintiff failed to present any prece-
dent to the contrary. See id. at 1257. In fact, the defendants believed that any law limiting the offi-
cer's reliance on statements would be considered "new law." Id. at 1258.
143. 749 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1984).
144. See Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1432.
145. See Baptiste, 147 F.3d at 1259.
146. See id. at 1260.
147. 146 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998).





153. See Radecki v. Barela, 146 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998) (second appeal); Radecki v. Barela,
77 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1996) (first appeal). The Tenth Circuit based the first appeal on Uhirig v.
Harder, 64 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1995), a prior decision that determined the standard for a plaintiff to




against an individual police officer, she must demonstrate that the officer
acted in a manner that 'shocks the conscience.""' In doing so, the court
replaced the "reckless" standard with a more stringent one: namely, one
that required the conduct to be "conscience-shocking." Notwithstanding
this fact, the district court ruled that Barela's conduct did, indeed, "shock
the conscience" and found for the plaintiff."' The second appeal resulted.
b. Decision
In the second appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the defendant's conduct violated clearly established law based
upon the substantive component of the due process clause." The sub-
stantive component of the due process clause protects individuals from
actions of the government "regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them.".... While procedural due process provides "a
guarantee of fair procedure in connection with any deprivation of life,
liberty, or property by a State,"'58 substantive due process goes further
and protects individuals from behavior that "shocks the conscience,"
even when that behavior complies with the procedural due process re-
quirements.
With this concept in mind, the Tenth Circuit evaluated whether
Barela's conduct rose to a conscience-shocking level." The Supreme
Court's holding in Sacramento County v. Lewis,"W provided the structure
for this analysis: to trigger scrutiny of a due process violation, the con-
duct must have been motivated by harmful intent and fail to further a
legitimate government interest. 6 ' Under this analysis, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that Barela was not liable because the plaintiffs failed to al-
lege that he acted with intent to do harm. 2 Accordingly, the Tenth Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's grant of qualified immunity."
154. Radecki, 146 F.3d at 1229 (citing Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 571).
155. Id.
156. See id
157. Id. (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (providing the
standard for determining whether an official's actions violate the substantive portion of the due
process clause)).
158. Id. (citing Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
159. See id. at 1230.
160. 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998)). In Lewis, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of what degree
of fault is necessary to make a constitutional claim against a police officer on substantive due proc-
ess deprivation grounds. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1710. The violation in question involved a high
speed chase. See id. The degree of fault necessary in this type of situation was one in which the
police officer had the purpose "to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest." See id. at
1711. In making its determination, the Supreme Court considered (1) the need for restraint in defin-
ing their scope, (2) the concern that section 1983 not replace state tort law, and (3) the need for
deference to local policymaking bodies in making decisions impacting upon public safety. See id.
161. See id. at 1718.
162. See Radecki v. Barela, 146 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998).
163. See id.
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C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's treatment of qualified immunity during the sur-
vey period illustrates the practical effects of the Supreme Court's hold-
ings in Behrens and Johnson, which attempted to create a more stable
body of immunity law. The Tenth Circuit, acting in accord with these
cases, limited its review of qualified immunity to interlocutory appeals
only where abstract issues of law existed. " This heralded a departure
from the former Tenth Circuit treatment of qualified immunity which
allowed interlocutory appellate review whenever a court denied to grant
immunity to an official, regardless of whether the issue pertained to
questions of law.
Additionally, the court's denial of immunity in Clanton and Baptiste
demonstrated a strong Tenth Circuit intent to compensate victims for
deprivations of their individual rights.'6" In Clanton, where the defendant
official was alleged to have provided false information in an affidavit,
the court's decision to deny immunity was relatively straightforward.
The court's role in Baptiste, however, was more complex. The Baptiste
court examined whether the law at issue was clearly established or
whether it was advancing "new law."" The court distinguished the facts
in the cases offered by the defendants from those in the present case."
This distinction obliterated any chance for the defendants to obtain im-
munity; however, the court did not characterize its holding as "new law."
Rather, in observing the totality of the circumstances, the court merely
recognized that the need to compensate a victim of an illegal search and
seizure outweighed the interest in preserving police discretion to deter-
mine probable cause, and held accordingly. Even in Clanton, where the
plaintiff was unable to offer precedent demonstrating that the defendant's
conduct violated clearly established law, the Tenth Circuit boldly pro-
vided case law in its absence.' In both cases, the Tenth Circuit seemed
acutely aware of the danger in granting immunity in situations where
officials may use their power to further their own interests.
164. See Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1157 (10th Cir. 1991), overruled by Johnson v.
Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995). For procedural summaries of the Tenth Circuit's review of orders
denying summary judgment based upon qualified immunity, see Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416,
1422 (10th Cir. 1997), and Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F3d 1547, 1551-52 (10th Cir. 1995).
165. Congress' intent in the enactment of section 1983 was not only to remove the barriers to
the federal court system that civil rights litigants faced, but also to provide a remedy against bad
actors who in other circumstances would be immune. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monetl Legacy:
Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under § 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
539, 548 (1989).
166. See Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998).
167. See Baptiste, 147 F.3d at 1259.
168. See Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit cited
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), as demonstrating that the law was clearly estab-
lished prior to the conduct in question. See id.
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The Tenth Circuit offered some consolation to officials, however. In
Radecki, the court expanded its procedural process to allow for multiple
appeals of the denial of qualified immunity.'" This provides officials
seeking such immunity several chances to obtain its protections.'
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit created yet another hurdle to plain-
tiffs in section 1983 actions by raising the standard for evaluating official
conduct from "reckless disregard" to conduct that "shocks the con-
science."'7' A requirement of conscience-shocking behavior, being more
difficult to prove, will allow more officials to prevail on qualified immu-
nity. This is unfortunate, since the proper place for evaluating con-
science-shocking behavior should be with the fact finder and not the ap-
peals court.
This problem, however, serves to illustrate the quandary courts are
placed in when called upon to evaluate conduct resulting when an offi-
cial is called upon to utilize his discretion in emergency situations. As
was true in Radecki, the official may not have time to properly determine
what consequences could arise from the conduct at issue, and necessity
dictates in such situations that deference be given to such conduct when
the actor makes a good faith mistake.'" Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit,
following the policy set forth by the Supreme Court, deferred to local
policymaking officials whose decisions impact public safety.'
D. Other Circuits
While the other circuits appear to follow the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to evaluating denials of qualified immunity, there seems to be
confusion as to when an interlocutory appeal is factual in nature rather
than one concerning an abstract issue of law. For instance, the Fifth Cir-
cuit observed that, under certain circumstances, "a court of appeals may
have to undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what
facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, likely 'assumed."'7
169. See Radecki, 146 F.3d at 1232.
170. See Radecki v. Barela, 77 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying Medina v. City and County
of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1494 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that in order to be considered a constitu-
tional violation, the plaintiff must prove that "the state actor directed his or her conduct toward the
plaintiff")).
171. Radecki, 77 F.3d at 493 (citing Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling that to
satisfy the shock the conscience standard, a plaintiff must do more than show that the government actor
intentionally or recklessly caused injury to the plaintiff by abusing or misusing government power)).
172. Cf Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
173. See Radecki, 146 F.3d at 1232 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708,
1718 (1998) (discussing the need for restraint when defining the scope of substantial due process for
the purpose of adhering to local officials policymaking power)).
174. Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 289 (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319
(1995), and holding a denial of qualified immunity based upon questionable facts as one not pre-
senting a question of law).
1999)
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Other circuits grappled with similar issues. F6r instance, the Fourth
Circuit, in Brooks v. Davis,'" dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction
when it determined that a denial order was not properly raised in a mo-
tion for summary judgment and was, therefore, not appealable.76 The
Fourth Circuit recognized that the appeals court exercises jurisdiction
only over final orders and certain interlocutory and collateral orders." In
the present appeal, the order was neither a final order nor an appealable
interlocutory or collateral order because the defendants failed to claim
qualified immunity in their motion for summary judgment.'7" The Fourth
Circuit concluded that dismissal of the appeal was proper because the
facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the materials
before the court, and argument would not aid the decisional process."
III. LIMITED LIABILITY UNDER THE DocTRINE OF MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
A. Background
In the last few decades, the Supreme Court has substantially altered
municipal liability under section' 1983. Prior to 1978, the Court inter-
preted section 1983 to provide a remedy for plaintiffs against individual
state and local officials only."l In Monroe v. Pape,"' the Supreme Court
observed that Congress specifically rejected an amendment to the statute
that would have included municipalities within its scope."' Thus, mu-
nicipalities were not subject to section 1983 liability.'
The decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services," however,
overruled Monroe by expanding the statute to include municipalities.' In
Monell, the Court determined that a municipality is not immune when its
employee violates a constitutional right by carrying out an official policy
of that municipality.'" In reversing Monroe, the Court observed that
175. See Brooks v. Davis, Nos. 97-7374, 97-7449, 1998 WL 196739, at *1 (4th Cir. April 24,
1998) (unpublished opinion).
176. See id. at *2.
177. See id. at *1 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)).
178. See id. at *2 (citing Buffington v. Baltimore County, 913 F.2d 113, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1990)
(stating that, to the extent that defendants challenged the district court's denial of summary judgment
based upon their claim of qualified immunity, raised only in their answer, they waived this claim by
failing to raise it in either their motion for summary judgment or their objections to the magistrate
judge's report)).
179. See id.
180. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 659 (1978).
181. 365 U.S. 167(1961).
182. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190-91 (theorizing that Congress must have questioned its power
under the Constitution to draft legislation imposing civil liability on state municipalities and, thus,
rejected to do so).
183. See id. at 188-89.
184. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).




Congress intended for the statute to include municipal actions that were
traceable to municipal policies.""7 Thus, Monell indicated that if a mu-
nicipality's policy caused a constitutional violation, it would be held
liable for that violation.' u The Court noted that the concept of respondeat
superior did not apply to a municipality, stating that liability must be
based upon more than the relationship between an employer and an em-
ployee, liability must be attributable to a policy decision of the munici-
pality.'1
In Board of County Commissioners v. Brown,'90 the Supreme Court
recognized that causation need not be proven when a municipality's pol-
icy is clearly unconstitutional.'9 There are certain situations, however,
where a policy is lawful on its face, thus making the inquiry of causation
and culpability much more difficult."m Cases that allege inadequate hiring
and training policies fall into this latter category of review.'"
The Supreme Court addressed the specific issue of inadequate mu-
nicipal official training policies in Canton v. Harris.'" There, the Court
held that liability as a result of inadequate training required a showing of
"deliberate indifference."'" The following Tenth Circuit decisions reflect
the inherent difficulties in determining municipal liability.
187. See id at 690-92 (concluding that the main issue in determining whether municipal liabil-
ity exists is one of causation).
188. See id. at 691.
189. See id. at 693-94.
190. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
191. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 406.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1996) (determining that the
training regimen of a police department need not include specific instruction intended to prevent
officers from raping young women); Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 93 n.6 (Ist
Cir. 1994) (stating that there is no obvious need for extensive training of officers in how to deal with
the mentally handicapped); cf Kerr v. City of W. Palm Beach, 865 F.2d 1546 (1lth Cir. 1989)
(recognizing the inadequacy of training for the police force's canine unit); Doe v. Calumet City, 754
F. Supp. 1211, 1225 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding the city liable for failure to train officers regarding
constitutional limitations on strip searches).
194. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
195. Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. The Court determined that in order to satisfy the deliberate
indifference standard, a municipality must have actual or constructive notice that its action or failure
to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation and consciously or deliberately
choose to disregard the risk of harm. See id. (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397,407 (1997)).
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B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. J.B. v. Washington County"
a. Facts
J.B. arose from a situation in which Pamela Humphreys, a Wash-
ington County Deputy, received an eyewitness report of a father sexually
abusing his seven-year-old child." After consulting with two judges, the
county attorney, and the Utah Division of Family Services, Humphreys
filed a petition with the juvenile court requesting an order to temporarily
remove the child, L.B., from her home to conduct an interview.'" The
juvenile court granted the order and the child was removed for seven-
teen-and-one-half hours.'" The interview revealed no evidence of child
abuse and the juvenile court dismissed the case for lack of sufficient evi-
dence.' L.B.'s mother, J.B., sued Washington County.f' The district
court entered summary judgment in favor of the county.'
b. Decision
In determining the constitutionality of the county's policy, the Tenth
Circuit first analyzed whether the conduct was in accord with the
county's policy or custom. The plaintiff maintained the burden of prov-
ing that the act of removing L.B. from the home in situations where sex-
ual abuse is suspected conformed to the policy of Washington County.'
The Tenth Circuit found that the decision to remove L.B. from her home
to interview her was in accord with the County Sheriff's Office's policies
and procedures and, therefore, met the first prong of the municipal li-
ability test.2
The second prong of the analysis focused on causation. In deter-
mining whether the action taken caused a deprivation of a protected
right, the Tenth Circuit first examined whether any such right was at
issue.' In holding that one was, the court noted that the plaintiff argued
violations of her right to procedural and substantive due process, her
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, and her right to equal protection of the law.'
196. 127 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 1997).
197. See J.B., 127 F.3d at 922.
198. See i.




203. See id (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
204. See id. at 924 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-22-2 (Supp. 1996)).
205. See id.
206. See id. at 923-3 1.
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The Tenth Circuit next weighed J.B.'s interest in having her rights
safeguarded against the interest of the state in protecting the interests of
children within its jurisdiction.' Concluding that the state's interest out-
weighs that of J.B., and holding, accordingly, that the actions of the
county did not result in a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.'
2. Barney v. Pulsipher?
a. Facts
Two female inmates alleged that their jailer, Gerald Pulsipher, sexu-
ally assaulted them in two separate incidents t Both inmates were serv-
ing minor sentences-a DUI conviction and a shoplifting conviction!"
Box Elder County Jail Procedures required two jailers to be on duty each
shift; however, when the violations took place, Pulsipher was the only
jailer on duty.2' In both cases, Pulsipher took the female inmate to an
unmonitored area and sexually assaulted her?3
Barney and Christensen filed a section 1983 claim against the
county and its commissioners,"" asserting that the county policy for han-
dling female inmates was inadequate due to the county's failure to ade-
quately staff, train, and supervise its jailers."' As a result, they were sub-
jected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment."" The district court, in granting the county's motion for
summary judgment based upon qualified immunity, held that the defen-
dants did not act with deliberate indifference as required for an Eighth
Amendment violation. It further determined that, even had such indif-
ference been established, the conditions of confinement did not rise to
the level of cruel and unusual punishment.2"" Finally, the court held that
placing women in solitary confinement for the purpose of providing
separate housing for men and women furthered a legitimate governmen-
tal interest. 9
207. See id. at 925, 927,929, 931.
208. See id. at 932.
209. 143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998).
210. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1303.
211. See id. at 1304-05.
212. See id.
213. See id
214. See id. at 1303.
215. See id. at 1306.
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b. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed the plaintiff's claim that the
county should be held liable for failing to train Pulsipher.' Noting that
causation was difficult to prove in the instant case because the county's
training policy was "lawful on its face and the municipality therefore
[had] not directly inflicted the injury through its own actions,"' the
Tenth Circuit held that for liability to attach, the county must have had
constructive notice of its failure to act, awareness that the failure resulted
in a constitutional deprivation, and have consciously chosen to disregard
the risk of harm."' The Tenth Circuit concluded that the failure to train
claim failed because there was no evidence demonstrating that the mu-
nicipality was on notice that such actions were conducted prior to the
present incident.' The Tenth Circuit intimated that even if the training
policies were inadequate, it would be unreasonable to assume that rape is
an obvious consequence of a deficient training program.z' Additionally,
the Tenth Circuit focused on Pulsipher's background, which did not indi-
cate any reason for the municipality to believe that he would be likely to
sexually assault female inmates.2" Therefore, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the county was not liable for its decision to hire him.'
3. Myers v. Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners7
a. Facts
Tom Myers, intoxicated, suicidal, and armed with a .22 caliber rifle,
locked himself in his apartment, prompting his wife to call for police
assistance."5 The officers spent all afternoon and evening in contact with
Myers, attempting to prevent his suicide." Ultimately, the county sheriff
ordered entry into the apartment, Myers reacted by pointing a gun at the
police officers, and the police officers responded by shooting and killing
Myers.'
Suzanne Myers filed suit under section 1983, alleging that, in
shooting her husband, the Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department and
the Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners violated his
220. See id.
221. Id. (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406 (1997) (recognizing
that when the policy is unlawful on its face, the causation element is easily ascertained)).
222. See id. at 1307 (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 407).
223. See id. at 1308.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 1308-09.
226. See id. at 1309.
227. 151 F.3d 1313 (1998).





Fourth Amendment rights."' In particular, Myers claimed that the offi-
cer's use of excessive force in attempting to apprehend her husband, in
addition to the department's failure to adequately train its officers in the
use of force, violated Myers rights."2 Further, Myers claimed that her
husband's Eighth Amendment rights were violated, asserting that the
failure of the county "to train its officers in suicide prevention, counsel-
ing the mentally ill, or treatment for substance abusers" triggered liabil-
ity." The district court granted summary judgment on each claim in fa-
vor of the municipality based upon municipal immunity.'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit based its analysis on the decision set forth in Mo-
nell v. Department of Social Services,"5 which established that liability
may attach to a county if an employee, acting pursuant to county poli-
cies, violates a constitutional right.a' The court observed that the trial
jury concluded that Myers was not deprived of either his Fourth or
Eighth Amendment rights-a conclusion that possibly precluded the
county from liability.237 In so noting, the Tenth Circuit cited City of Los
Angeles v. Heller," where the Supreme Court held that if "a municipality
is 'sued only because [it was] thought legally responsible' for the actions
of its officers, it is 'inconceivable' to hold the municipality liable if the
officers inflict no constitutional harm." 9
Notwithstanding this holding, however, the Tenth Circuit observed
that there are situations where a municipality is not precluded from li-
ability even when the jury finds for the defendant official.2' This situa-
tion arises when a jury concludes that the defendant official violated a
constitutional right, but should have been granted qualified immunity
231. See id. at 1316.
232. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see Myers, 151 F.3d at 1316. In Monett, the Court determined that a
plaintiff who sues under section 1983 must demonstrate that the municipal employee actually vio-
lated a constitutional or statutory right, and that it was the policy of the municipality that was the
driving force behind the infringement. See Monel, 436 U.S. at 658.
236. See Monel, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
237. See Myers, 151 F.3d at 1316-17 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799
(1986) (noting that an employee who was acquitted of a charge of excessive force "precluded the
imposition of liability on the City of Los Angeles for adopting a policy condoning the use of exces-
sive force")). In Webber v. Mefford, 43 F.3d 1340, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1994), the court held that
"[b]ecause [defendant police officer] did not violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the district court
correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against the [city] for inadequate training, supervision, and
pursuit policies." Webber, 43 F.3d at 1344. The court went on to state: "A claim of inadequate
training, supervision, and policies under § 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory authority
absent a finding of a constitutional violation by the person supervised." Id. at 1345.
238. 475 U.S. 796 (1986).
239. Heller, 475 U.S. at 799.
240. See Myers, 151 F.3d at 1317.
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because he or she acted reasonably." The Tenth Circuit noted that, in
Heller, even though the district court denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment based upon municipal immunity, the record on ap-
peal did not establish the basis of the verdict--consequently, the Heller
rule did not preclude the municipality from suit.2
The Tenth Circuit found the evidence in the instant case, however,
insufficient to establish that the county's officer training policy on the
use of excessive force gave rise to a constitutional deprivation. ' It con-
cluded that that policy was "well within constitutional bounds, 2" noting
that Myers aimed his weapon in the police officers' direction despite the
fact that the officers announced themselves upon entering.' The court
likewise held that the county's training for dealing with armed persons
who are suicidal, mentally ill, and/or substance abusers was adequate.'
As to the allegation that the county violated the Eighth Amendment, the
Tenth Circuit held there was insufficient evidence to show that not only
did a constitutional violation occur, but that it was the county policy that
caused the injury?'7
4. Pietrowski v. Town of Dibble'
a. Facts
In January 1991, Chief of Police Jackson arrested Pietrowski for
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and speeding. '9 Town po-
lice detained Pietrowski until March 29, 1991, when he was released on
bail.' He was acquitted of DUI in September of the following year." '
Pietrowski later filed a section 1983 claim against the Town of Dib-
ble, arguing lack of care in the hiring and training of the chief of police,
who allegedly subjected Pietrowski to malicious prosecution.' 2 The dis-
241. See id.; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
242. Myers, 151 F.3d at 1317-18.
243. Id. at 1318 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (holding that the
only time a failure to train will serve as grounds for municipal liability is when it reflects a "deliber-
ate" or "conscious" refusal by the municipality to rectify the failure)); see also Houston v. Reich,
932 F.2d 883, 888 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a municipality will be liable only for a complete
failure to train or for grossly negligent or reckless training likely to result in future misconduct).
244. Myers, 151 F.3d at 1318; see Romero v. Board of County Comm'rs, 60 F.3d 702, 704
(10th Cir. 1995) (establishing that, for the purpose of self defense, an officer's use of excessive force
is not constitutionally unreasonable).
245. See Myers, 151 F.3d at 1318.
246. See id. at 1319.
247. See id. at 1320.
248. 134 F.3d 1006 (10th Cir. 1998).
249. See Pietrowski, 134 F.3d at 1007.
250. See id
251. See id.
252. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
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trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the town on the
claims."3 An appeal followed.
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by pointing out that "an action
against a person in his official capacity is, in reality, an action against the
government entity for whom the person works."' Noting Pietrowski's
argument that the lower court should not have granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the town because, in his malicious prosecution claim, he
sought to hold the town liable for its lack of care in hiring and training
the chief of police," the Tenth Circuit suggested that, without the use of
respondeat superior, the plaintiffs claim was more than likely insuffi-
cient.' Further, the court observed that the plaintiff did not present ade-
quate evidence that the hiring and training procedures were insufficient
to withstand summary judgment.' Thus, holding that a plaintiff must
show that the policy or custom of the town contributed to the deprivation
in order for the town to be held liable for a constitutional violation, '8 and
that the town's decision "reflect[ed] deliberate indifference to the risk
that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right [would]
follow,"' the Tenth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff failed to make
such a showing and was therefore not entitled to prevail. Accordingly, it
affirmed the holding of the district court.' °
C. Analysis
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit handled several cases
involving the municipal immunity doctrine. Each case dealt with the
doctrine differently, depending on the type of claim asserted. In J.B., it
was apparent that the conduct at issue conformed with the policy of the
county." Thus, the court held the municipality free from liability after
concluding that the policy of taking potentially abused children out of the
home was constitutional and stating the Tenth Circuit's objective was to
protect public welfare agencies from needless litigation that could take
away from the efficiency of policing child abuse. 2 Similarly, in Myers,
where the court upheld the adequacy of the defendant county's policy
providing for the training of officers on excessive force, the county was
253. See id. at 1008.
254. Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165--66 (1985)).
255. See id. at 1009.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id. (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997)).
259. Id. (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 411).
260. See id.
261. See J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 923 (10th Cir. 1997).
262. See id.
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likewise held free from liability. 3 And finally, in Barney, the court
found that municipal training policies do not require education on how to
abstain from sexually assaulting inmates, consequently holding the de-
fendant municipality free from liability owing to the sexual misconduct
of one of its jailers.'
The Tenth Circuit reviewed claims against municipalities conserva-
tively, with clear deference to agency discretion, finding on several occa-
sions that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the municipality
both knew of an official's improper actions and failed to correct them.
This approach occurred in Barney, where the court found that the evi-
dence was insufficient to conclude that the defendant commissioners
knew of the jailer's criminal conduct.' It also occurred in Pietrowski,
where the plaintiff was unable to prevail on his claim against the Town
of Dibble because the evidence was not sufficient to establish a lack of
care in the hiring and training of its police chief.' Unfortunately, be-
cause the Tenth Circuit declined to indicate why the evidence was insuf-
ficient, we cannot determine why they came to that conclusion.
In general, the Tenth Circuit appeared reluciant to give deference to
victims of constitutional harms where a municipality was involved. De-
spite the fact that, in some situations, justice can only prevail when a mu-
nicipality is held liable for the criminal actions of its employees, the Tenth
Circuit closely adheres to the view that respondeat superior does not ap-
ply. ' Due to the Supreme Court's failure to recognize that the focus of the
judicial inquiry should not be on the municipality and constitutionality of
its policies, but on the conduct of those representing it, the victim is forced
to carry the evidentiary burden of proving not only that the complained-of
conduct took place, but that the municipality knew of its occurrence and
failed to rectify it.' Consequently, the Tenth Circuit has no choice but to
find for the municipality in most situations, thus "exposing the public to a
tremendous risk of invasions of civil rights"' and ensuring that the only
way a victim can prevail on a municipality claim is when the policymaker
itself creates the constitutional wrong.
263. See Myers v. Oklahoma County Bd., 151 F.3d 1313, 1318-19 (1998); cf David Rudovsky,
How to Handle Unreasonable Force Litigation: Prosecution and Defense Strategies in Police Mis-
conduct Cases, 590 PtiC. L. INsT. 259, 321-22 (1998).
264. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1998).
265. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1311.
266. See Pietrowski v. Town of Dibble, 134 F.3d 1006, 1009 (1998).
267. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
268. See Susannah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Be-
comes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REv. 517, 532 (1987) (rejecting the Supreme Court view that
the theory of respondeat superior is inapplicable to municipality litigation). Mead noted that Con-
gress "intended to impose liability for constitutional harm on those who have not themselves done
the 'subjecting,' but rather are responsible for those who have," thereby determining that even
though the municipality did not actively cause the harm, the action of its employees falls within the
causation theory. Id at 532-33.




While the Supreme Court's holding in Monell dictates the standard of
review employed by circuit courts evaluating municipal liability in section
1983 actions, variations in fact patterns make the outcome of such actions
anything but predictable. For example, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a case
in which the main issue on appeal centered on county liability for unsafe
prison conditions.' ° In determining whether the defendant county was de-
liberately indifferent to potential harms to prison detainees, the Eighth
Circuit noted that substantial evidence of constitutional violations existed
to support imposition of liability.27' Absent such substantial evidence, how-
ever, the Eighth Circuit, in similar fashion to the Tenth, is unlikely to place
liability on a municipality for the acts of its employees."
CONCLVSION
From the Harlow and Brown Court's reformation of the heightened
pleading standard in certain qualified immunity cases, to Behrens' ex-
pansion and distortion of the procedural process for appealing such
claims, it seems that the Tenth Circuit's desire to protect government
officials and the agencies employing them grossly outweighs the court's
desire to protect the individual liberties set forth in the Bill of Rights. For
more than forty years, the Supreme Court struggled with immunity under
section 1983 and still it offers, at best, an unstable body of law. Thepur-
pose of section 1983 is not furthered when the federal courts create mis-
guided policies to protect public officials from taking responsibility for
their own actions. Until the Supreme Court recognizes the original intent
behind passage of the civil rights statute, justice will forever be denied to
those who have been constitutionally victimized.
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270. See Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998). The facts arose out of a
situation where a fifteen year old was detained and, while awaiting trial, was brutally tortured, raped,
and humiliated by other detainees for a period of five days. See id. at 922.
271. See Washington County, 150 F.3d at 922-23 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994) (recognizing that prison officials may be held liable under Eighth Amendment for denying
humane conditions of confinement only if they know that inmates face substantial risk of serious
harm and disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to change it)).
272. Cf Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 475-76 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
arrestee could not satisfy deliberate indifference standard in claim based solely on plaintiff's place-
ment in a cell designed to accommodate wheelchair-confined inmates); Doe v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist.,
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